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TITLE IX: AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
FOR SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION FOR THE ACADEMIC
EMPLOYEE?
INTRODUCTION

With the enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Congress committed the federal government to the
eradication of sexual discrimination in the field of education." Section 901 of that statute prohibits sex-based discrimination in educational programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.2 Considerable conflict has developed, however, as to the
I Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976)
and scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.). Congress enacted Title IX in response to evidence
of significant sexual discrimination in the field of education. See H.R. REP. No.- 554, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2511-12; 117
CONG. REC. 39252 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan); DiscriminationAgainst Women: Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 506-510 (1970). The purpose of Title IX was to eliminate the use of federal
funds to subsidize discriminatory policies in educational institutions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773, 778 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Buek & Orleans, Sex Discrimination-ABar to a
Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 6
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Note, Title IX Sex DiscriminationRegulations: Impact on Private
Education, 65 Ky. L. REv. 656 (1977); Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discriminationin Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REv. 103 (1974).
Title IX originally was part of a legislative package that also amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), to include
educational employees within the prohibitions of Title VII of that Act against employment
discrimination. See H.R. No. 16098, § 805(b), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Ultimately, this
portion of the legislation became part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970)). The same
legislative package also amended the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976 & Supp. III
1979), of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), to
include executive, professional and administrative personnel within its provisions. See 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. mI 1979).
2 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
Section 901 provides in pertinent partNo person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Section 901 also lists certain exemptions to its general prohibition against sex discrimination, including religiously controlled institutions and military and
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scope of this central provision. In particular, there has been disagreement as to whether section 901 includes educational employees
within its protections.4 Recently, in North Haven Board of Educamerchant marine academies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(9) (1976).
3 Section 901 has fostered two controversies. First, the courts have differed as to
whether section 901, which protects persons only from "discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," encompasses every program or
activity conducted by an educational institution receiving federal funds notwithstanding
that the discriminatory program actually receives no federal funds. Compare Dougherty
County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1980) and Romeo Community
Schools v. United States Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) and Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are
Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 63-64, 71-72 (1976) and Comment, HEW's
Regulation Under Title IX of the EducationAmendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges,
1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 133, 158-68 (cases and other sources favoring a requirement that the
specific program or activity be federally funded) with North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d Cir. 1980) and Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 37-40 (1977) and Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments: Preventing Sex Discriminationin Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REV. 103, 10812 (1974) (cases and other sources favoring institutional approach). See also United States
v. El Camino Community College Dist., 600 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) (institution
bears burden of showing information requested by HEW will not affect practices in program
for which federal financial assistance is sought). The second major division of authority concerns the scope of the mandate of section 901 that "no person" be subjected to sex discrimination in a federally funded educational program. See note 4 and accompanying text infra.
The enforcement provisions of Title IX empower the federal agencies responsible for
administering financial assistance to educational institutions to promulgate rules and regulations effectuating the prohibition of sex discrimination. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Pursuant
to this grant of authority, the Department of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW) issued
regulations proscribing sex-based employment discrimination in federally funded educational institutions. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979). The majority of courts considering the
issue, however, have held that these regulations are invalid, reasoning that Title IX does not
provide authority to regulate employment practices. See Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d
992, 993 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119, 121 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424,
430 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp.
693, 695 (N.D. Ohio 1979); McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41, 42-43 (D. Kan. 1978).
But see North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1980); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1980). It should be noted
that some courts have stated that Title IX prohibits employment discrimination only to the
extent that discriminatory impact on students can be shown. Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621
F.2d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Caufield v. Board of Educ., 486 F. Supp. 862,
883-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
It should be noted that after the establishment of the Department of Education, see
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (Supp. III 1979)), the "education-related civil rights functions" of
HEW were transferred to the auspices of the newly formed department. S. REP. No. 96-49,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1514, 1550; see
Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (Supp. III 1979). The regulations implementing Title IX, which were originally promulgated by HEW, have been
adopted by the Department of Education and recodified without change in Title 34 of the
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tion v. Hufstedler, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed this question and held that employees of
educational institutions receiving federal funds are entitled to the
safeguards of Title IX.8
In North Haven, the Second Circuit was presented with two
cases in which suit had been commenced by a local board of education challenging the validity of certain federal regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX.7 The plaintiffs asserted that these reg-

ulations, which prohibited sexually discriminatory employment
practices in educational institutions receiving federal aid,$ exceeded the bounds of protection authorized by the statute.9 The
district court in each case agreed that Title IX is not applicable in
the employment arena and, therefore, declared the regulations in
question invalid. 10
On appeal, a unanimous Second Circuit panel reversed the decisions entered in district court.1 After noting that the language of
Code of Federal Regulations. Compare 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979) (HEW regulations)
with 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802, 30,955-64 (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Part 106, Subpart E) (Department of Education regulations).
5 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
6 Id. at 786.
7 Id. at 774-75. In North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler,the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), the federal agency then responsible for administering Title
IX, see note 4 supra, responded to a private complaint that the North Haven school district's maternity leave policy was sexually discriminatory by requesting the school district to
provide certain information relating to its employment practices. 629 F.2d at 775. After
North Haven refused the request, HEW advised that it would seek institution of the administrative enforcement proceedings provided by Title IX. Id. The school district then commenced this declaratory judgment action, challenging the HEW regulations on employment
as promulgated "in excess of the statutory authority conferred by Congress." Id.
In Trumbull Bd. of Educ. v. Department of Educ., a female former guidance counselor
in the Trumbull public school system instituted a Title IX administrative proceeding, alleging several counts of sex-based employment discrimination. 629 F.2d at 775. HEW, finding
that there had been sex discrimination, ordered the district to reinstate the complainant
and to take other "corrective" action. Id. The Trumbull Board of Education then commenced the present declaratory judgment action. Id.
8 The principal prohibition against sex-based employment discrimination provides:
No person shall, on the basis of sex be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefore, whether full-time or part-time,
under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or
benefits from Federal financial assistance.
45 Fed. Reg. 300,802, 300,962 (1980) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.51); see note 4 supra.
9 629 F.2d at 775.
10 Id. Moreover, the district courts enjoined the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare from withholding federal funds for violations of the regulations. Id.
11 629 F.2d at 786. The panel was comprised of Circuit Judges Kaufman and Oakes and
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section 901 does not "clearly [encompass] employment discrimination," 12 Judge Oakes, writing for the court, undertook a comprehensive examination of the legislative history of Title IX.' s As a
result of this analysis the appellate court concluded that section
14
'
901 "was expressly intended to relate to employment practices.
The court of appeals, first discussing the congressional action
surrounding the enactment of Title IX, found support for its conclusion in the statements of Senator Birch Bayh.' 5 Although the
court noted that caution should be exercised to ensure against improper reliance on "casual statements from floor debates,"' 6 the
Second Circuit reasoned that the combination of statements made
by the main proponent of the legislation in introducing the legislative package to the Congress, in response to specific inquiries by
his colleagues, and after the passage of Title IX, clearly demonstrated that Senator Bayh's intention was that employment be
covered by section 901.17
The court also found the actions taken in the House of Representatives supportive of its position. In a House version of the legislation which culminated in the Education Amendments of 1972, a
section that specifically excluded employment from the protective
ambit of Title IX had been added.' 8 Judge Oakes found the omission of such language from the final House bill to be at least some
District Judge Tenney of the Southern District of New York sitting by designation.
11Id. at 777. Although HEW argued that the "person[s]" protected by section 901 must
include employees since none of the nine express statutory exclusions to that provision encompasses employment, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(9), the Second Circuit panel found
HEW's argument unpersuasive.
13 Id. at 778-84.
1,Id. at 784.
11 See id. at 779-82.

16 Id. at 781 (citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
17 629 F.2d at 779-82. The court stated that Senator Bayh's statements indicating that
section 901 applied to employment "are at the very least helpful and may indeed be authoritative." Id. at 782 (citing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packer & Warehousemen, Local 760,
377 U.S. 58, 67-68 (1964); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 39495 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
's629 F.2d at 782-83. The provision in the House bill, section 604 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter [Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964] shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the
Federal financial assistance is to provide employment.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 604, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
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indication of a congressional intent to make section 901 applicable
to employees of educational institutions receiving federal financial

aid. 9
Finally, the Second Circuit found significance in the congressional action taken after the enactment of Title IX. First, Judge
Oakes observed that, as required by law,2 0 the Congress reviewed
the regulations that were challenged in the North Haven case and
declined to express disapproval.' Second, the court of appeals
noted several unsuccessful attempts to limit the scope of section
901.2 These occurrences, viewed by the court "in the context of
the legislative history as a whole," were found to constitute additional evidence of legislative intent to extend the protections of Title IX to the employment arena.' 3
629 F.2d at 783. The North Haven court rejected the argument advanced by other
courts of appeals, see Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), that the original version of the House bill excluded educational
employees from the coverage of Title IX to avoid inconsistency with other sections of the
bill amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 629 F.2d at 780; see note 1 supra; H.R.
7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1006-1009 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2566. Judge Oakes reasoned that if
Congress were concerned merely with removing these legislative inconsistencies, it could
have drafted an employment exclusion applicable only to section 901. 629 F.2d at 783.
20 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976). Section 1232(d)(1) provides that regulations of federal
agencies will become effective "unless the Congress shall, by concurrent resolution, find that
... the final regulation... is inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority..
19

•" Id.

21 629 F.2d at 783-84. As required by law, see note 20 supra, Senator Jesse Helms introduced a concurrent resolution challenging the validity of all Title IX regulations. See S.
Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. Rnc. 17301 (1975). The resolution never
passed. Id.; 629 F.2d at 783-84. Subsequently, both Senator Helms and Senator McClure
proposed amendments to limit the scope of section 901. Id. at 784; see 121 CONG. REc.
23,845-47 (1975); 122 CONG. RIc. 28136 (1976). Neither was adopted. 629 F.2d at 784. Judge
Oakes recognized that the mere failure of Congress to adopt the resolution introduced by
Senator Helms could not be read as evidence of congressional approval of the regulation in
question. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976). He concluded, however, that this refusal,
coupled with the other developments previously mentioned, were in combination indicative
of congressional intent to include employees within Title IX's protective scheme. Id.
22 See note 21 supra.
22 629 F.2d at 784. The North Haven court briefly disposed of two other arguments
militating against its construction of section 901. Id. at 785. First, it rejected the position
that Congress would not penalize an entire program by withholding federal funds because
one employee was a victim of sex-based discrimination by noting that HEW has this authority if only one student is a victim of discrimination. Id, Second, the court dismissed the
argument that employment discrimination is not program specific and stated that it is "no
less 'program specific' than other practices recognized as subject to the provisions of Title
VI and Title IX." Id.
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THE North Haven RESULT: AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY FOR SEXBASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX

The panel deciding the North Haven case discerned a clear
congressional intent to include employees within the protection of
Title IX. Notwithstanding the existence of substantial authority to
the contrary, 4 investigation of the legislative history of the statute
supports the North Haven result.2 5 It is clear, however, that some

degree of ambiguity is present in both the language of Title IX and
the events surrounding its passage.2 " Thus, it is submitted that the
court should have examined more fully the implications of its decision. 27 An analysis of the results of North Haven, however, confirms the propriety of the decision and reveals that the Second Circuit has provided employees of federally funded educational
institutions with a salutary alternative remedy for gender-based

employment discrimination.
24

See note 4 supra.

2 Those courts which have held that Title IX does not safeguard educational employees from sex-based employment discrimination have employed little independent discussion
of the issue. See, e.g., Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980)(per curiam);
Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
The decision in Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979), frequently has been relied upon by those courts which have refused to
extend Title IX's protections to educational employees. In Islesboro, the First Circuit accorded significance to the fact that Title IX was only one portion of a legislative package
and reasoned that the final omission of a specific exclusion for employees was meant to
avoid inconsistencies with the other sections of the legislation. 593 F.2d at 428; see note 19
supra. The Islesboro court was not persuaded by the statements of Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the Title IX legislation. Id. at 427-28. The Second Circuit in North Haven, employing
a more comprehensive analysis of the relevant legislative history, reached a result contrary
to that adopted by the First Circuit in Islesboro. 629 F.2d at 778-86.
2 Both the drafters' failure to define precisely the "person[s]" protected by section 901
and the fact that the legislative history of Title IX also refers to amendments to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), have contributed to the ambiguity. See 629 F.2d at 777-78.
27 Where neither the express language of a statute nor the history of its enactment
conclusively determines that one possible interpretation controls over another, a court
should examine the policy implications of a purported construction in determining the validity of such an interpretation. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
737 (1975); accord, Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); Tsoy v. Mac Farland, 219 F. Supp. 220, 223
(D. Md. 1963).
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The Next Step-An Implied Private Right of Action Under Title
IX For Employment Discrimination
The North Haven court gave no indication that, as a result of
its decision, an individual would be able to maintain a private action for sex-based employment discrimination against an educational institution receiving federal funds.2 8 Additionally, Title IX
does not expressly provide a private right of action. Section 902 of
the statute authorizes two modes of enforcement. 29 First, voluntary
compliance with the prescriptions of Title IX is sought.3 0 Second,
if efforts to attain compliance fail, federal funds to the program
that is in violation may be terminated. 31 An implied private right
of action under Title IX, however, recently was recognized by the
32
Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago.
28 The court did note, however, that its decision would to some extent cause the safeguards available under Title IX to overlap with those of other federal statutes. See 629 F.2d
at 784; see notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra.
29 Education Amendments of 1972, § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Section 902 in pertinent part provides:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with
such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding
has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law- Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken
until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
20 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Voluntary compliance with the provisions of Title IX must
be sought by the agency charged with enforcement of Title IX before institution of any
other enforcement procedure. Id.; see, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629
F.2d at 785; Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 583 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119, 120 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
3120 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976); see note 29 supra.
2 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See generally Comment, Title IX: No Longer an Empty Promise-Cannon v. University of Chicago, 29 DEPAuL L. REV. 263 (1979); Comment, Private
Rights of Action Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 3 HARv. WOMEN L.J. 141 (1980); Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A
Product of Statutory Constructionor the Federal Common Law Power, 51 U. CoLo. L. REV.
355 (1980); Case Note, Cannon v. University of Chicago: Civil Rights and Private Wrongs: A
New Remedy, 48 U. Mo.-KAN. Crry L. Rav. 487 (1980); Note, Broadening Access to the
Courts and Clarifying Judicial Standards:Sex DiscriminationCases in the 1978-1979 Supreme Court Term, 14 U. RiCH. L. Rlv. 515, 520-31 (1980).
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In Cannon the Court held that a plaintiff who allegedly had
been denied admission to medical school because of her sex could
maintain
a private cause of action in federal court under Title
IX.33 Although the Cannon majority did not address the question
whether such an implied right of action would extend to an educational employee asserting Title IX rights, nothing in the Supreme
Court opinion suggests that employees of federally funded educational institutions should be excluded. Moreover, the factors utilized by the Cannon Court to imply a private right of action for an
unsuccessful applicant to medical school apply with equal force to
educational employees.3 4 Thus, it is submitted that a necessary ress441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, a woman applied unsuccessfully for entrance into
medical programs at two private universities, both of which were recipients of federal funds.
Id. at 680 & n.1. After each institution denied her admission, she commenced suit under
Title IX and various other federal civil rights statutes in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257,
1258 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Finding that Title IX "does not authorize a private right of action,"
id. at 1259, the district court dismissed the complaint, id. at 1260, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1083 (7th Cir.
1977). Although the court of appeals recognized that rights of action had been implied
under other federal statutes, id. at 1072, it concluded that "[i]t
is clear that no individual
right of action can be inferred from Title IX in the face of the carefully constructed scheme
of administrative enforcement contained in the Act," id. at 1073.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision below. 441 U.S. at 68889. In examining the issue before it, the Court applied the test it had promulgated previously in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, that test was prescribed as follows:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," . . . that is, does the statute
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? . . .Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?
3 Id. at 78 (citations omitted). The Cannon Court found that all of these factors supported
the implication of a private right of action under Title IX. 441 U.S. at 709. Cf. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979) (dispositive question for determining if an implied cause of action exists is one of congressional intent). See generally
Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation Act:
A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VmL. L. REv. 657 (1978); Note, Remedies-PrivateRight of Action Not to Be Implied from Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 50
TuL. L. REv. 713 (1976); 47 Miss. L.J. 156 (1976).
34 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 689-709. The only Cort factor that
arguably could present difficulty in application to employees is "the threshold question...
whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a
member." Id. at 689; see note 33 supra.Analysis of the first Cort factor in Cannon, however,
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suit of the Second Circuit's decision in North Haven and the Supreme Court's holding in Cannon is the existence of an implied
private right of action under Title IX notwithstanding the status
of the plaintiff as employee.
Other Sources of Protection Against Gender-Based Employment
Discrimination
Several federal sources of redress already are available to victims of discrimination in employment because of sex. Of these alternatives the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the most compre38
hensive protective scheme.3 5 Title VII of the 1964 Act (Title VII),

designed to eliminate discriminatory employment practices and to
promote equal employment opportunity, 7 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin .... Moreover, the judiciary has
centered on the language of section 901, which was drafted "with an unmistakable focus on
the benefited class" of "persons," instead of "simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by
recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to
educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 691-93. Thus, assuming the validity of the North Haven holding-that
employees of educational institutions receiving federal funds are "persons" within the
meaning of section 901-it is clear that after Cannon, an implied private right of action is
available to educational employees as well as students.
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp.
Ill 1979).
37 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 602 (7th
Cir. 1979); EEOC v. General Tel. Co. of Northwest, Inc., 599 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir.), affd,
446 U.S. 318 (1980). See generally Jones, The Development of the Law under Title VII
Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30 RuTGEmS L. REv. 1 (1976); Lopatka, A 1977
Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination,1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69;
Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 824 (1972).
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). It is interesting to note that, as originally proposed, Title
VII did not apply to sex discrimination. See H.R. REP. No. 414, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2391. Anomalously, it appears that
the addition of sex to the list of impermissible bases of employment discrimination was an
afterthought-added with the primary intention of defeating passage of the bill. See 110
CoNG. REc. 2581 (1964); Note, Sex Discriminationin Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671, 676-77.
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broadly construed this prohibition of employment discrimination."9
The substantive rights created by Title VII potentially offer
effective safeguards from gender-based employment discrimination. In practice, however, aggrieved individuals sometimes have
found Title VII less than adequate.4 0 Although the federal courts
are given subject matter jurisdiction in Title VII actions,'41 the provisions of the statute evince a clear preference for resolution of
claims through an administrative process.' 2 Thus, before a victim
of employment discrimination may institute suit, he must exhaust
a complex and often burdensome administrative procedure. 4' The
3' See, e.g., Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979); Craig v.
HEW, 581 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1978); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See generally Bukes, Administrative Prerequisites to Litigation Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Recent Developments, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 633 (1979).
Broad judicial construction of Title VII is evidenced by the ease in stating a prima facie
violation of the statute through demonstrating that an employer's hiring or promotion criteria have a statistically disproportionate effect on a protected class. See Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 427 (7th Cir. 1977); Stewart v. General
Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1976). Thus, an aggrieved individual need not
show an invidious intent to discriminate. See generally Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact
and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1977).
Case Note, DisparateImpact and DisparateTreatment: The Prima Facie Case under Title
VII, 32 ARK. L. REV. & BAR Ass'N J. 571 (1978). Intentional discrimination, on the other
hand, is necessary to establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
40 See, e.g., Greene v. Carter Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125, 127 (8th Cir. 1976) (action
dismissed for failure to file charges with EEOC within statutory time period); EEOC v.
Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1974) (suit dismissed for EEOC's failure to
notify employer that conciliation failed); Mickel v. South Carolina State Employ. Sarv., 377
F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967) (dismissed parties not named in
original EEOC complaint). See generally Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy?, 45 NOTRE DAM
LAW. 46 (1973); Casey & Slaybod, ProceduralAspects of Title VII Litigation: Pitfalls for
the Unwary Attorney, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 87 (1975).
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976).
In enacting Title VII, Congress did not provide for a private cause of action unless an
aggrieved individual first seeks relief from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency created by Title VII to enforce its provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1) (1976). If the EEOC fails to bring suit, dismisses the case, or is unable to achieve
conciliation, the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter to the aggrieved employee which enables
him to seek judicial relief. Id.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(f) (1976). Following the allegedly discriminatory practice, a
complainant is given 180 days to file a claim with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
The failure to file timely may result in a dismissal. See Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d
960, 963 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v. Carter Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125, 126 (8th Cir. 1976).
After filing, the EEOC will determine if the charge is supported by reasonable cause and
will attempt reconciliation between the parties. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). The statute,
however, provides for a deferral procedure whereby individual state fair employment agen-
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adequacy of the remedy available to a successful Title VII plaintiff
also has been questioned. 4 A prevailing party is entitled to equitable relief including back pay and reinstatement.45 The judiciary,
however, generally has refused to award compensatory or punitive
damages for violations of Title VII, 4e notwithstanding allegations

that equitable relief alone may fail fully to effect the purposes of
the statute. 7
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983), 48 also has been utilized by litigants in an
attempt to provide some additional measure of protection against
sex-based employment discrimination." Specifically, section 1983
authorizes a private cause of action for deprivations of federal
rights by persons acting under color of state law.50 Although the
cies may assume jurisdiction over the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(d) (1976). Such deferral
is mandatory if the state agency operates under a statute analogous to Title VII, but the
EEOC will resume its investigation of the complaint if the state agency fails to act within a
specified time period. Id. At the expiration of 180 days, the EEOC must issue the complainant a right-to-sue letter, see note 42 supra, which entitles the complainant to institute a
private suit within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). See generally B. ScHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRMIATION LAw 769-826 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Shawe, Employment Discrimination-The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
Deferral Quagmire, 5 U. BALT. L. Rzy. 221 (1976).
" See Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAv. L. REv. 1109, 1261 (1971); Note, Section 1985(3): A
Viable Alternative to Title VII for Sex-Based Employment Discrimination,1978 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 367, 372. See generally Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The "Recovery Stage," 16
WM. & MARY L. REv. 507, 510-19 (1975).
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Backpay is the most commonly granted type of monetary relief. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-21 (1975); White v.
Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1087 (4th Cir. 1977); Wells v. Meyer's Bakery,
561 F.2d 1268, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1977). Such awards, however, are limited to amounts accrued within two years prior to the filing of the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.5(g) (1976).
11 E.g., Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Pearson v. Western Elec Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1151 (10th
Cir. 1976); Curran v. Portland Superior School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1078 (D. Me.
1977). But see Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973);
Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 838 (W.D. Tex. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974).
47 E.g., White v. North La. Legal Assistance Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (W.D.
La. 1979); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Howard v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 855 (N.D. Ga. 1974); see Comment, Implying Punitive Damages in Employment DiscriminationCases, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 33437 (1974); Note, Section 1985(3): A Viable Alternative to Title VII for Sex-Based Employment Discrimination,1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 367, 372.
'8Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
" See note 53 infra.
50 Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute ...

of any State ... subjects...
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statute initially was given a restrictive interpretation,5 1 recent liberal construction has occasioned frequent use of section 1983 to
redress violations of a variety of federal rights, 52 including discrimination in employment on the basis of sex."' The coverage of the
section is limited, however, since a prima facie case under the statute requires a showing of state action.54
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The purpose of the statute was to provide a mechanism for the enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment, see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), and, more particularly, to grant federal courts jurisdiction
over constitutional claims against state officials. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502
n.30 (1978); Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 128586 (1953). For general analysis and discussion of section 1983, see McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of ConstitutionalProtections, 69
VA. L. REv. 1 (1974); Noble, Civil Rights-An Analysis of Section 1983 and Title VII: A
Comparative Strategy, 23 TItL LAW. GUIDE 49 (1979).
51 E.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872); see Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. Rav. 1133, 1161 (1977). Because of its early restrictive interpretation, the statute rarely was utilized during the first 50
years after its enactment. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). See generally Note, The Proper Scope of
the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1953).
52 E.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
1SSee, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 636 (1974); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d
796, 797 (6th Cir. 1971); Sylvania Educ. Ass'n v. Sylvania Bd. of Educ., 14 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 577, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 995 (ED. Pa.
1974); see Reiss, Requiem For "An Independent Remedy:" The Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1871 as Remedies ForEmployment Discrimination,50 S. CAL. L. Rev. 961, 993 (1977).
I" The requirement under section 1983 that the defendant must act under color of state
law, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Graseck v. Mauceri, 582 F.2d
203, 207 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Triplett v. Azordegan, 570 F.2d
819, 822 (8th Cir. 1978); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1388 (6th Cir. 1972), has been interpreted as equivalent to the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. Briley v.
California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977); see Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183,
1185 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012 (1975). Thus, to state a prima facie violation of section 1983, the plaintiff generally must demonstrate that his federal rights were
violated with knowledge of and pursuant to state law or statute. Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); cf. City of
Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 1976) (section 1983 does not provide redress
for deprivations of rights under color of federal law). See generally Hendrickson, "State
Action" and Private Higher Education, 1972 J.L. & EDuc. 53, 58-75; Note, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. Rev.
656 (1974).
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In addition to the available statutory remedies, an individual
aggrieved by sex-based employment discrimination may be able to
seek redress directly under the United States Constitution. In Davis v. Passman,55 for example, the plaintiff commenced an action
in federal court under the fifth amendment, claiming that her employment had been terminated solely because she was a woman.56
Finding that the alleged conduct of the defendant violated the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment,5 7 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the plaintiff's right to
maintain such a private cause of action. 8 Moreover, the Court held
that money damages were an appropriate remedy for the violation
since there was no difficult question of valuation or causation and
no available alternative forms of relief.59 The utility of a constitutionally based cause of action generally to redress sex-based dis5' 442 U.S. 228 (1979). See generally Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Cause of Action and
Damages Remedy Implied under Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause-Davis v. Passman, 53 TEmp. L.Q. 120 (1980); Note, BroadeningAccess to the Courts and ClarifyingJudicial Standards: Sex DiscriminationCases in the 1978-1979 Supreme Court Term, 14 U.
RiCH. L. REv. 515, 542-51 (1980).
Z6 442 U.S. at 231. Davis was dismissed from her job because her employer believed
that it was "essential" that her position be filled by a man despite his acknowledgement
that she was "able, energetic and a hard worker." Id. at 230 & n.3.
57 Id. at 234-35 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).
I' 442 U.S. at 236-44. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Fifth Circuit, noted that the
lower court erred in applying the Cort factors, see note 33 supra, to determine whether an
action could be implied under the Constitution. 442 U.S. at 232-34. Noting that "the question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of
who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution," id. at 241 (emphasis in
original), the Court reasoned thatAt least in the absence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" . . . we presume that
justifiable constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts. And, unless
such rights are to become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege
that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time
have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be
able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their
justiciable constitutional rights.
Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 245-49. The Court distinguished the existence of a private right of action under
the Constitution from the availability of judicial relief in such an action. Had the Court
found that the relief which Davis sought was unavailable, it would have dismissed her complaint. Id. at 244. The Court determined, however, that damages would be obtainable if
Davis prevailed on her claim, since a damages remedy is appropriate and normally available
to litigants in federal court. Id. at 245, 248. It should be noted that the decision in Davis
was based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had no other available remedies. See id. at
245 n.23, 247 & n.26; note 60 and accompanying text infra.
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crimination, however, is doubtful. Although the Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Passman evinces a policy favoring the
availability of some type of remedy for sex-based employment discrimination, it appears as though recovery directly under the Constitution may be permitted only where there is no congressionally
created "equally effective alternative" remedy. 0
The Propriety of an Additional Cause of Action
The utilization of the Cannon implied right of action under
Title IX, in conjunction with the Second Circuit's holding in North
Haven, provides academic employees with a more effective remedy
against sex discrimination than had been previously available.6 1
Thus, this new remedy further implements the congressional objective of eradicating gender-based job discrimination. 2 Concededly, Title VII was intended to serve as the primary means of
achieving this goal, but the Supreme Court has observed that "the
legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to
allow an individual to independently pursue his rights under both
63 It
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.
10 Id. at 248; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980). The existence of an alternative remedy will not foreclose the availability of a private cause of action under the Constitution unless it was intended by Congress to preempt the constitutional remedy or to
create an equally effective one. Id. at 14. The Davis decision, however, indicates that the
availability of relief under Title VII would preclude suit directly under the Constitution. 442
U.S. at 246-47.
01 Although state action is a necessary element of a cause of action for sex discrimination under the Constitution or under section 1983, it is not an element of the plaintiff's
cause of action under Title IX. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); note 54 supra. Moreover, under Title IX, a plaintiff
need not resort to an elaborate administrative process as he or she must under Title VII.
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.8, 706-07 & nn.40 & 41 (1979). See
also note 43 supra.
02 See note 1 supra. See also 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Educ. & Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 737 (1970).
03 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974); see 110 CONG. REc. 7207
(1964)(remarks of Sen. Clark); cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,
461 (1975) (remedies available under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e17 (1976), and under section 16 of Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976), are separate and distinct); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416-17 & n.20
(1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), did not
repeal section 18 of Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)). But cf. Brown v.
General Serv. Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976)(section 717 of Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination for federal employees).
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would seem, therefore, that the existence of Title VII should not
restrict the power of Congress to create new and possibly overlapping remedies.
One recent Supreme Court decision, however, arguably indicates that Title IX may be unavailable as an alternative remedy to
Title VII for academic employees. In Great American FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Novotny,64 the United States Supreme
Court held that section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)) 6 5 may not be used to assert substantive
rights already available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.6 A significant consideration of the Court in this decision was
its perception that if suit under section 1985(c) was permitted as
an alternative to Title VII, "the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in
the scheme established by Congress in Title VII. '' 67 Yet, recogni-

tion of an implied private right of action under Title IX to redress
employment discrimination based on sex in federally funded educational institutions also would permit the circumvention of the
administrative procedures established under Title VII 6 s It is suggested, however, that this result is not irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's rationale in Novotny. Indeed, closer inspection of
the Novotny decision reveals that the issue of whether section
442 U.S. 366 (1979). See generally Note, BroadeningAccess to the Courts and Clarifying Judicial Standards: Sex Discrimination Cases in the 1978-1979 Supreme Court
Term, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 515, 532-42 (1980); 65 CORNELL L. REV. 114 (1979).
15 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)).
Early Supreme Court interpretation of this statute required a showing of state action as
part of the prima facie case. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1951); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875)(dictum). Subsequent decisions of the
Court, however, have broadened the scope of section 1985(c), e.g., Griffin v. Breckinridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that section 1985(c) also protects against private conspiracies motivated by a "class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." 403 U.S. at 102. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975). But
cf. Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1972)(state action required unless
racial conspiracy or violation of interstate travel alleged). See generally Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its OriginalPurpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.402 (1979).
" 442 U.S. at 378.
67 Id. at 376.
"I The Novotny decision may be narrowly interpreted, however, since the Court expressly limited its consideration to whether section 1985(c) could be used to circumvent
Title VII. 442 U.S. at 370 n.6. It might be argued, nonetheless, that logical extension of the
Court's holding mandates disallowance of an implied right of action under Title IX since
the latter also could be utilized to circumvent Title VII. See 65 CORNELL L. REV. 114, 125
(1979).
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1985(c) may be used to circumvent Title VII is distinguishable
from whether the private cause of action under Title IX may be
used to supplement the protective scheme of Title VII.
The Novotny Court relied heavily on the remedial nature of
the statute under which the suit was commenced. 9 Section 1985(c)
provides a private action for damages to victims of conspiracies to
deprive one of the "equal protection of the laws, or... equal privileges and immunities under the laws," but creates no substantive
rights.70 Although limiting the scope of section 1985(c), the Court
in Novotny nevertheless expressly reaffirmed its previous decisions
holding that Title VII and other contemporary legislation did not
implicitly repeal earlier statutes which conferred "similar substantive rights.

7'

The Novotny holding, therefore, does not present a

serious impediment to recognition of a private right of action for
damages for sex-based employment discrimination under section
901 of Title IX, since that section creates an independent substantive right in favor of individuals to be free from discrimination because of sex in federally funded educational programs. Moreover,
the fact that an individual's rights under Title IX may overlap
with those previously possessed under Title VII presents little difficulty, since the existence of independent alternatives is wholly
consistent with the congressional scheme of eliminating sex-based
employment discrimination. 2
CONCLUSION

Relevant federal legislation for sex-based employment discrimination, while extensive, has serious limitations. The Second
Circuit's decision in North Haven, however, appears to provide an
effective alternative remedy for victims of sex discrimination in
federally funded academic institutions. Although this remedy has
not yet been subjected to scrutiny by the Supreme Court, it is sub69 442 U.S. at 376-78.
70

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) with 20 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).

71 442 U.S. at 377 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1977);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)); see note 63 and accompanying text
supra.
72 See note 62 supra.
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mitted that an examination of the pertinent legislative history supports the Second Circuit's conclusion that Title IX was intended to
reach discrimination in employment.
Dorothy E. Murphy

